Show Summary Details
Page of

Responsibility and psychopathy 

Responsibility and psychopathy
Responsibility and psychopathy

John McMillan

and Luca Malatesti

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD MEDICINE ONLINE ( © Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Medicine Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 25 May 2022

The previous chapters have described in some detail the cognitive, affective, and social deficits of those who score highly on Hare's psychopathy checklist. This section of the book considers what this implies about the moral responsibility of psychopaths. The chapters in this section discuss these issues from a variety of perspectives and while each chapter is self-contained, it is useful to sketch the general geography of the philosophical debate about psychopathy that is related to the ascription of moral responsibility.

We begin by saying why the moral responsibility of psychopaths is an important issue. Then, we consider the preconditions for moral responsibility. It will emerge that possessing moral understanding and being in control over one's actions are central preconditions that might be significant when considering the moral responsibility of psychopaths. Then, we discuss the points of convergence between the empirical work on psychopathy discussed in Section II of the book and these capacities.

Access to the complete content on Oxford Medicine Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.